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1. Introduction 
Consequentialism continues to make ethicists nervous. There is 
widespread agreement even among its critics that consequentialism 
has come to play a dominant role in ethical theory. Ironically, the 
more this is perceived to be the case, the greater the anxiety be-
comes to "escape" from its "spell". 1 Proposed escape routes come 
in many varieties. However, there is a common core to the main 
arguments against consequent ia l i sm: the charge that 
consequentialism either demands too much of people or demands 
the wrong things of them. This charge is motivated by consider-
ation of cases involving (what are usually taken to be) agent-rela-
tive reasons, including, on one hand, the pursuit of one's own 
projects, interests, commitments and personal relationships, and 
on the other, rights and deontological constraints. These cases are 
understood in very different ways by the different critics, but the 
conclusion is the same: consequentialism must be wrong because 
it cannot accommodate our strong moral intuitions about these sorts 
of cases. 
Consequentialism is indeed a powerful moral theory. I find 
nothing surprising nor scandalous about its dominant role in con-
temporary ethics. However, I agree in the end that it must be re-
jected, though for very different reasons. Nevertheless, the reasons 
for my rejection can be appreciated by cons ider ing a 
consequential ist reply to these criticisms. The core of the reply is 
that consequentialism can accommodate the intuitions lying be-
hind the troubling cases by suggesting that while we can certainly 
imagine cases in which acting on one's projects or on constraints 
will fail to maximize value, it also maximizes value for individuals 
to develop dispositions and habits to act with these things as moti-
vations, and so people who act on such dispositions even in prob-
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lematic cases cannot be held to be blameworthy (even if, strictly 
speaking, their actions are wrong). This is an extremely important 
reply. Indeed, within it, we find one of the most important realiza-
tions to be included in any plausible ethical theory: that moral evalu-
ation cannot be limited to the examination of a particular act iso-
lated from considerations of the dispositions, habits, patterns of 
behavior and causal history leading to it. But I will also argue that 
if we take this insight seriously, when combined with certain plau-
sible assumptions regarding the causes of human action and be-
havior and the nature of agency—and in particular, what I call psy-
chological determinism—what we have is no longer a defense of 
consequentialism against its more deontological critics. Rather, we 
have argument for the incoherence of consequentialism itself. But 
this should not be taken as vindication of the cri t ics of 
consequentialism. Both camps are guilty of a shared misunderstand-
ing. 
This misunderstanding infects the way in which the very de-
bate is set up. Both sides attempt to explain the Tightness, wrong-
ness, permissibility and impermissibility of individual actions. But 
if the realization above is correct, this is not how ethical theory 
should be organized. Rather than studying and evaluating individual 
acts, we need rather to study causal relationships between whole 
patterns of behavior. My radical suggestion is that ethics should 
not primarily concern itself with the notions of right and wrong, 
and insofar as consequentialism is one theory with this concern, it 
must be replaced. While I cannot fully elaborate on the sort of 
alternative moral theorizing I have in mind, it would not likely 
coincide with the largely agent-relative theories offered by so many 
contemporary critics of consequentialism. These theories are as 
much, and probably more, guilty of the same misplaced concern. 
2. Options and Constraints: The Attack on Consequentialism 
Consequent ia l i sm—limited in this debate to act-
consequentialism—is here understood as the theory that an act is 
right if and only if there are no alternatives to that act that would 
have better overall consequences. Consequentialism is also 
standardly wedded to a purely agent-neutral conception of "better 
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consequences", i.e. the goodness or badness of the consequences 
of an act is not relative to the standpoint of the evaluator. Critics 
charge that this theory cannot accommodate some of our most ba-
sic moral intuitions, and they usually trace this failure back to a 
poor understanding of moral agency and the full range of morally 
relevant reasons we have for acting. In particular, consequentialists 
cannot make room in their theory for options or "agent-centered 
permissions" and constraints or "agent-centered restrictions". 
To understand agent-centered permissions, consider the fol-
lowing hypothetical scenario. It has been my lifelong project to 
become a professional academic in philosophy. I have earned my 
Ph.D. and am now faced with searching for a job in a tight job 
market, one in which I have very little hope of receiving a posi-
tion. Suppose I do manage to become a finalist for a certain posi-
tion, although I am relatively certain that if I do not receive this 
appointment, another offer will not be forthcoming. The decision 
has come down to two candidates. My rival, who has the same 
lifelong project as I, has rather similar philosophical credentials 
and either of us would do an equally good job at the position. One 
of us will be appointed, and the other will be unable to fulfill his or 
her project. Now suppose also that I have certain computer related 
skills that my opponent lacks, skills having no bearing on my abil-
ity to fulfill my potential role as an academic philosopher, but which 
could secure me a relatively stable and happy future at a different 
job. My rival has no such skills, and indeed, if she or he were to 
fail to obtain an academic job, while certainly she or he would find 
work, it would not be as secure or enjoyable as the sort I could 
receive. Now, the question becomes whether I should morally with-
draw myself from consideration. It seems that, impersonally con-
sidered, consequences will be better if it is I who ends up working 
outside academia. According to consequentialism, not only is it 
right, but I am morally obligated to withdraw myself from consid-
eration. 
Critics of consequentialism point out that this seems wildly at 
odds with our ordinary moral intuitions. While it may seem per-
missible, perhaps even morally praiseworthy, for me to withdraw, 
I am not obligated to, nor would I be doing anything wrong if I 
chose to continue my candidacy. Consequentialism is thus missing 
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something, but how is this to be explained? According to Samuel 
Scheffler, we must recognize that, while we might be able to adopt 
an impersonal perspective for evaluating the aggregate good, we 
also have a quite independent personal point of view in which our 
own projects and commitments loom larger than those of others. 
This personal point of view is an important feature about us as 
moral agents, and it is rational for moral theory to do justice to the 
nature of persons by somehow taking this into account. Scheffler 
argues that one reasonable way to do this would be to include agent-
centered permissions, or allowances to agents to weigh their own 
concerns and projects somewhat more in moral deliberation. Thus, 
they would be given a limited protective sphere in which to pursue 
their own projects even if this leads to failure to maximize the overall 
good.2 Other theorists tend to put the point in a stronger way. Ber-
nard Williams argues that consequentialism forces agents to see 
their own projects as dispensable, and therefore represents an at-
tack on the integrity of individuals, and can only lead to alien-
ation.3 The core of the argument, however, is the same. Without 
the inclusion of options to pursue one's own interests and projects 
out of strict proportion to how doing so maximizes the good, 
consequentialism ignores that people have their own subjective 
standpoints, with their own concerns, projects and commitments, 
and no theory that ignores this very important feature of moral 
agency can be adequate* 
Often included under the general rubric of options or agent-
centered permissions, but sometimes treated separately, are those 
"special obligations" and commitments stemming from our per-
sonal relationships with family members, friends and loved ones. 
Standard consequentialism demands that we weigh the good of all 
people equally, and that just as we are not permitted to put our own 
interests, projects and livelihood ahead of that of others, we are not 
permitted to give extra weight to the interests, projects and liveli-
hood of our friends and relatives. This, too, seems at odd with our 
normal moral intuitions. Diane Jeske and Richard Fumerton ask us 
to consider a case in which we must decide between saving the life 
of one's own child or the lives of two unknown children.5 They 
suggest that it seems as if one should have the option (and perhaps 
even the duty) to exhibit greater concern for one's own child in 
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such a case. But this poses a problem for consequentialism, with 
its purely nonrelativistic conception of value. Consequentialism 
demands that we treat everyone impartially, but it is a morally sig-
nificant feature of persons that we do develop relationships that 
seem to require us to treat individuals partially, giving extra weight 
in our moral decision making to individuals because of the rela-
tionships they bear to us. Here, too, consequentialism fails to take 
adequate account of the nature of persons as moral agents. 
Deontological constraints are more controversial. Even the crit-
ics of consequentialism cannot agree on whether they exist and 
can be given the same defense as options. 6 There are at least some 
theorists, however, who argue that they do exist and that their ex-
istence reveals a similar flaw in consequentialist thought. Still, much 
of the literature deals not with unambiguous examples in which 
we clearly must not engage in some morally objectionable but 
optimific acts, but rather with cases for which the answer provided 
by the consequentialist is not clearly the right act. These examples 
are meant to prove that there must be something more to the moral 
assessment of acts than consideration of their consequences, be-
cause otherwise these situations would not be the difficult puzzles 
that they obviously are. Thomas Nagel provides us with this ex-
ample: 
You have an auto accident one winter night on a 
lonely road. The other passengers are badly in-
jured, the car is out of commission, and the road is 
deserted, so you run along it till you find an iso-
lated house. The house turns out to be occupied 
by an older woman who is looking after her small 
grandchild. There is no phone, but there is a car in 
the garage, and you ask desperately to borrow it, 
and explain the situation. She doesn't believe you. 
Terrified by your desperation she runs upstairs and 
locks herself in the bathroom, leaving you alone 
with the child. You pound ineffectively on the door 
and search without success for the car keys. Then 
it occurs to you that she might be persuaded to tell 
you where they are if you were to twist the child's 
arm outside the bathroom door. Should you do i t? 7 
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The consequential ist answer to this sort of answer is clear: the bad-
ness of the child's arm being twisted momentarily is far outweighed 
by the need to get your injured friends to safety. But common sense 
morality seems to recognize that certain types of acts are objec-
tionable even if their consequences are for the overall good. Many 
would conclude that twisting the child's arm is such a restricted 
act. There are limits to what one may do in pursuit of good conse-
quences. Even if we do conclude of this particular case that it is 
permissible to twist the child's arm, certainly the decision is not as 
easy as the consequentialist makes it out to be. Especially if we are 
to imagine that the relative advantages in terms of overall conse-
quences are small, the permissibility of acts involving lying, break-
ing promises, betrayal, torture, intentional injury or harm can be 
called into question. A moral theory that claims that there are cases 
in which we are morally barred from performing some act that 
maximizes the good is one that incorporates constraints, or agent-
centered restrictions. 
How are such restrictions to be justified? Nagel suggests that 
the most promising avenue is to also understand them as agent-
relative reasons, or reasons stemming from our subjective stand-
points as moral agents. I can recognize, from an impersonal per-
spective, that twisting the child's arm (or killing one innocent to 
save the lives of five others, etc.) will lead to better consequences. 
But I also recognize that it requires me to knowingly commit an 
evil or objectionable act as a means towards some good end. But 
as a moral agent, I have a personal reason to object to allowing my 
actions to be directed by evil (even if I have the best overall conse-
quences in mind.) Williams suggests something similar: as agents, 
we care not only about what states of affairs come about, but about 
what we directly do as opposed to what we only allow to happen. 
Insofar as consequentialism incorporates a purely agent-neutral 
conception of the good, and a theory of right based entirely on the 
consequences of the act in question, consequentialism cannot ac-
commodate these sorts of considerations. 
So far, I have only been engaged in describing uncritically how 
it is that many critics of consequentialism argue by invoking op-
tions, constraints and special obligations. Criticism will come later. 
But it is worth here summarizing some of the major themes of this 
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approach and bringing to light some of the more implicit assump-
tions about how the task of ethical theory is understood within this 
tradition. In each case, we are asked to imagine a certain case in 
which a person has to make a moral decision. It is then argued in 
each case that consequentialism fails to make sense of the perspec-
tives or situations of those moral agents who are forced to make 
such decisions. It seems that underlying this strategy is the idea 
that ethical theory is theory about how individuals on individual 
occasions should go about reasoning about what acts in that situa-
tion are right, wrong, permissible or obligatory in that situation. 
The focus is thus on the nature of moral agency, and it is presup-
posed that what is important about us as moral agents is that we are 
sometimes faced with moral quandaries in which we need to de-
cide between different alternatives, and that the task of ethical theory 
is to provide us with guidelines about what sort of reasoning is 
appropriate in these situations. This will be important later. 
3. Dispositions and Character: A Consequentialist Reply 
I now turn to what I take to be the most important consequentialist 
reply to the objection that consequentialism is flawed insofar as it 
cannot accommodate options, constraints and the value of prefer-
ential treatment of friends and loved ones. The reply has perhaps 
been given fullest attention in the work of Peter Railton,8 although 
I shall be taking it somewhat beyond what he explicitly has to say. 
The reply begins by noting that consequentialism typically di-
vorces the theory concerning under what conditions an act is right 
or wrong from assessment of the motives leading to an act or of the 
agent herself. There is nothing inherent in consequentialism to the 
effect that a person must act with maximizing the good in mind in 
order to be acting rightly. Thus, it need not be a dictum of 
consequentialism that people ought to explicitly conduct their moral 
deliberation according to consequentialist principles. Certainly, 
some important historical consequentialists, Sidgwick included, 
hoped that people would conduct their moral reasoning by attempt-
ing to determine what act would maximize the good and then so 
act. Railton labels the sort of consequentialism that includes the 
stronger thesis that people ought always to try to determine what 
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act will lead to the best consequences whenever faced with a moral 
decision subjective consequentialism. But Railton distinguishes this 
from consequentialism understood only as a theory about under 
what conditions an act is right or wrong. Objective consequentialism 
holds only that whether an act maximizes the good is the criterion 
making it right or wrong. One need not accept the former in order 
to accept the later. The objective consequentialist can hold that 
there are cases in which a person ought not to try to govern her 
deliberations according to consequentialist principles. In many 
cases, the impersonal good will be better served if people act with-
out performing anything resembling a calculation of the potential 
good and bad to be had by the alternative choices. To complete 
Railton's vocabulary, a sophisticated consequentialist is a person 
"who has a standing commitment to leading an objectively 
consequentialist life", 9 but who acknowledges that acting as a sub-
jective consequentialist is not necessarily the best, only, or most 
appropriate way to accomplish this. 
One should already see here a deviation in how the sophisti-
cated consequentialist understands moral theorizing from how oth-
ers, particularly the sorts of deontological critics referred to in the 
previous section, understand it. Here, consequentialism is under-
stood not as a theory about how people ought to go about moral 
deliberation, but rather only as an explication of the truth condi-
tions regarding what makes actions right or wrong. This may seem 
paradoxical at first, but is not. One could make a parallel for the 
rules of logic. Logic tells us what inferences are valid and what are 
invalid, but logic need not thereby be understood as dictating to us 
how we ought rationally to go about making inferences. In fact, 
the sorts of failsafe procedures favored by the logician (including 
exponentially complex procedures such as truth tables) might for 
various reasons not be the sorts of strategies people should ratio-
nally adopt as inference-makers. In fact, we might be prone to make 
more errors and manage our cognitive feats much less well if we 
tried to always infer according to the complex rules of logic. Mo-
rality may turn out to be similar. Ethical theory can tell us what 
makes an act right or wrong, but we need not infer from this that 
we ought to use the teachings of ethical theory in our moral rea-
soning. In fact, we might end up acting rightly less of the time if 
we did so. 
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What does this have to do with responding to the objections 
based on options and constraints? The sophisticated consequentialist 
still holds that an act is right only if it maximizes the impersonal 
good, and so, strictly speaking, cannot hold that it is actually per-
missible for an agent to disproportionally favor his or her interests, 
projects or those of families and friends. But the sophisticated 
consequentialist might hold that people ought to develop disposi-
tions to act and to deliberate in which they favor their own inter-
ests or treat people impartially based on their personal relation-
ships, not because it actually is permissible for them to act in this 
way when they have alternatives, but because acting with these 
motivations and having these sorts of relationships brings about 
better overall consequences than attempting to live as subjective 
consequentialists. Railton gives the following example of a person 
who acts based upon a personal commitment to another person: 
Consider, then, Juan, who . . . has always seemed 
a model husband. When a friend remarks on the 
extraordinary concern he shows for his wife, Juan 
characteristically responds: "I love Linda. I even 
like her. So it means a lot to me to do things for 
her. After all we've been through, it's almost a part 
of me to do it." But his friend knows that Juan is a 
principled individual, and asks Juan how his mar-
riage fits into that larger scheme. After all, he asks, 
it's fine for Juan and his wife to have such a close 
relationship, but what about all the other, needier 
people Juan could help if he broadened his hori-
zon still further? Juan replies, "Look it's a better 
world when people can have a relationship like 
ours—and nobody could if everyone were always 
asking themselves who's got the most need. It's 
not easy to make things work in this world, and 
one of the best things that happens to people is to 
have a close relationship like ours. You'd make 
things worse in a hurry if you broke up those close 
relationships for the sake of some higher goal.. .10 
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Juan is a sophisticated consequentialist. He has a standing com-
mitment to maximizing the amount of good in the world, but doesn't 
believe that this entails that he guide his every action by a 
consequentialist decision procedure. Rather, he thinks that things 
will be better off overall if he develops relationships and patterns 
of behavior that directly cause him to sometimes, perhaps even 
knowingly, perform acts which do not seem to be in the interest of 
the impersonal good. Railton goes on the give the following ex-
ample of how this might play out in an specific case: 
Consider again Juan and Linda, whom we imag-
ine to have a commuting marriage. They normally 
get together only every other week, but one week 
she seems a bit depressed and harried, and so he 
decided to take an extra trip to see her. If he did 
not travel, he would save a fairly large sum that he 
could send Oxfam to dig a well in a drought-
stricken village. Even reckoning in Linda's unin-
terrupted malaise, Juan's guilt, and any ill effects 
on their relationship, it may be that for Juan to 
contribute the fare to Oxfam would produce bet-
ter consequences overall than the unscheduled trip. 
Let us suppose that Juan knows this, and that he 
could stay home and write the cheque if he tried. 
Still, given Juan's character, he in fact will not try 
to perform this more beneficial act but will travel 
to see Linda instead. The object ive act-
consequentialist will say that Juan performed the 
wrong act on this occasion. Yet he may also say 
that Juan had had a character that would have led 
him to perform the better act (or made him more 
inclined to do so), he would have had to have been 
less devoted to Linda. Given the ways Juan can 
affect the world, it may be that if he were less de-
voted to Linda his overall contribution to human 
well-being would be less in the end, perhaps he 
would become more cynical and self-centred. Thus 
it may be that Juan should have (should develop, 
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encourage and so on) a character such that he 
sometimes knowingly and deliberately acts con-
trary to his objective consequentialist duty. Any 
other character, of those actually available to him, 
would lead him to depart still further from an ob-
jectively consequentialist life. The issue is... 
whether he would in fact decide to stay home if he 
had that character, of those available, that would 
lead him to perform the most beneficial overall 
sequence of acts. 1 1 
I will later argue that there are serious problems with Railton's 
account here, but for the moment it should be clear at least how 
this is meant as a way of capturing the intuitions many critics of 
consequentialism have with regard to options and special commit-
ments to friends and family members. Railton's strategy is not to 
admit that that it is ever right for a person to act so as to 
disproportionally favor a loved one, or one's own interests, but 
rather that what is right is to develop dispositions, habits and the 
sort of character that in general lead to the best sorts of conse-
quences but, unfortunately, also makes it necessary that a person 
will on occasion commit acts which—considered in isolation—do 
not maximize the good. So in this case, even under consequentialist 
guidelines, it is right for Juan to develop the devotedness he does 
to Linda, even if it leads him away from acting as a subjective 
consequentialist. Here we can see how projects can be incorpo-
rated within a consequentialist framework, not with the suggestion 
that it is right for us to disproportional ly weigh our own interests 
and commitments in all cases, but that it is right for us to develop 
dispositions and characters that will lead us to do so wrongly per-
haps in some cases, but in general are for the overall good. 
Railton doesn't explicitly discuss constraints, but it is clear 
that a similar argument could be given for them. Again, even the 
sophisticated consequentialist is committed to the idea that one 
ought always maximize the good, and so cannot hold that there are 
times in which we are not even permitted to do so, as constraints 
entail. Nevertheless, the sophisticated consequentialist might hold 
that it is right for us to develop certain dispositions to avoid or 
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refrain from participating in certain sorts of acts even when one 
has good reason to think that not refraining would have better con-
sequences. Consider lying. Certainly there are cases in which tell-
ing a lie would lead to better consequences than not lying, and this 
excludes the possibility of a general constraint against lying in 
consequentialist theory. However, this does not mean that the so-
phisticated consequentialist need hold that in each case when con-
fronted with a decision of whether or not to lie, we ought to per-
form a calculation of the goodness and badness of the effects and 
act accordingly. The sophisticated consequentialist might hold in-
stead that we ought to develop and encourage within ourselves a 
general disposition to be honest, even in conditions in which it 
appears that lying would have better consequences. Having such a 
disposition, although it might lead us to be honest in a case in which 
lying would actually have been our consequentialist duty, might 
overall lead to better consequences. If we instead took the subjec-
tive consequentialist approach, we might be prone to lie in cases in 
which it looked as if lying would be appropriate, but in fact only 
made things worse. Many of us know from our own experience 
situations in which we thought we could make things turn out all 
right with a lie, but had it backfire on us when the lie ended up 
leading to more lies and eventually to a much worse situation. ("Oh 
the webs we weave.. .") Rather than approaching such quandaries 
from the standpoint of the subjective consequentialist, sophisti-
cated consequentialism might hold it to be better to instill a gen-
eral penchant for honesty in people, albeit one which will lead us 
to do the wrong thing on occasion. Similarly, we can imagine that 
it is best to encourage in people a strong disposition to avoid doing 
such things as twisting children's arms, even to the extent that a 
person might not in fact do her duty and twist the child's arm when 
faced with the situation sketched above. I myself have argued in a 
previous paper precisely for the rationality of developing disposi-
tions against inflicting intentional harm on others for roughly these 
reasons. 1 2 Thus, while it is true that consequentialism cannot in-
clude constraints as the deontologist understands them, it can ex-
plain why cases such as twisting the arm or killing one innocent to 
save mult iple others are not as simple as the subjective 
consequentialist would have them. 
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There are interesting questions to be answered here in terms of 
exactly what sort of dispositions someone like Railton or like-
minded thinkers (including myself, in this instance) have in mind. 
Do we really want people to develop dispositions so strong such 
that one would be unable to lie in any conceivable circumstances? 
This is parallel to a problem facing deontologists. Many contem-
porary deontologists are dissatisfied with "absolutist" constraints, 
which would hold that it is always wrong to lie or always wrong to 
use physical force on an "innocent" child. If the deontologist de-
nies that constraints hold unconditionally, he or she must give some 
principled way to discriminate between situations in which a con-
straint applies and those in which they do not (without merely re-
sorting to an appeal to consequences.) However, the sophisticated 
consequentialist actually has the upper hand when it comes to of-
fering a solution to this sort of problem, because the sophisticated 
consequentialist can hold that such questions are empirical ones. 
They have to do with human psychology and the overall conse-
quences of different types of dispositions. Only psychological re-
search can tell us how behavioral dispositions are formed, what 
sorts are possible, how strong they can be, what sorts of disposi-
tions are stable, what the psychological side effects of acquiring 
"absolutist" dispositions are, etc. What the consequentialist is re-
ally interested in, of course, is the ultimate overall consequences 
of the various types of dispositions and characters that are possibly 
acquired by people. It may be that people are able to develop both 
dispositions so strong that they would be unable to hurt a child in 
any circumstances, as well as more flexible dispositions that pro-
mote general avoidance of doing so. Which are to be preferred is 
not something that can be known a priori. 
Consequentialists such as Railton thus seem to have a reply to 
the criticisms that consequentialism is lacking insofar as it cannot 
accommodate options and constraints. Of course, many critics of 
consequentialism might not agree that this reply is adequate. I 
myself believe there to be problems with this approach, which I 
will indicate shortly, but before I turn to those, let us consider the 
question of whether this approach is adequate as a reply to those 
who stress the importance of such things as options and constraints. 
A critic might charge that insofar as sophisticated consequentialism 
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only makes room for options, constraints and special obligations 
and permissions in terms of dispositions and patterns of behavior, 
which are themselves ultimately to be regarded as right only in 
terms of how such dispositions contribute to the overall good, it 
hasn't done full justice to the robust agent-relative importance of 
such things. In the Juan and Linda case, it seems that Juan's spe-
cial concern for Linda is to be justified only by how it leads to 
better overall consequences than any alternative character he could 
have. But the moral worth of such agent-relative concerns, the critic 
might insist, is not derivative on the impersonal good, but is rather 
a special kind of value. But I think we must resist this suggestion. 
There are a number of responses that could be made by Railton or 
a like-minded thinker. Firstly, as Railton himself suggests, the 
consequentialist always has the option of including in her account 
of the intrinsic good such things as love or friendship; these them-
selves can be said to have impersonal value. This step taken, it 
doesn't seem nearly as implausible to suppose that Juan's concern 
for Linda is only justifiable only if it leads overall to better imper-
sonal consequences. If we suppose instead that Juan's dispropor-
tional concern for Linda somehow makes things worse overall, 
making them or others miserable, so much so that the badness out-
weighs any good the love itself might represent, then it seems that 
Juan's disproportional concern is unjustified. One of the advan-
tages of Railton's approach over the approach taken by the critics 
of consequentialism is that it provides a natural demarcation line 
as to exactly how far options and constraints should be allowed to 
go. Deontologists seem to be aware that projects cannot be pur-
sued unconditionally, but they find it notoriously difficult to ex-
actly draw the line as what limitations there are on their pursuit. 
They also seem to be aware that constraints do not always hold up; 
if the consequences of not breaking the constraint are bad enough, 
the right thing to do would be to break it. On Railton's account, we 
can provide a consequentialist answer to these questions based on 
the balance of overall value. 
But there is one additional consideration that must be raised 
here. The arguments generally given for options and constraints by 
critics of consequentialism focus on the nature of persons as moral 
agents and as moral deliberators. They stress that it is natural for 
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agents to put extra weight on the concerns arising from their per-
sonal points of view, and that our integrity as moral agents de-
mands concern more with what we actually bring about as opposed 
to what we only allow to happen. But these arguments cannot touch 
objective consequentialism. They may be objections to subjective 
consequentialism, which does make claims about how moral de-
liberation and moral agency ought to proceed. Objective 
consequentialism, however, is not meant as a theory of proper moral 
agency or moral deliberation, and so the attacks focusing on how 
well consequentialism makes sense of us as moral agents miss the 
mark. It cannot be that objective consequentialism adopts a model 
for moral agency that leaves out or fails to do justice to important 
features of persons as moral agents , because object ive 
consequentialism simply does not include any model for moral 
agency or deliberation. It is meant only as an explication of the 
truth conditions for right action. 
Of course, many deontologists will still be dissatisfied, believ-
ing that moral theory must provide a theory of how to morally de-
liberate because the whole point of morality is to guide us in our 
practical decision making. While I am somewhat sympathetic to 
this line of thought, we must be careful. Again, the analogy to logic 
is helpful. Logic need not be understood as an inquiry into how we 
ought to reason, nor provide a model for how people ought to go 
about making inferences. But of course there is need for such models 
and strategies, and one would hope that whatever such strategies 
are developed would at least be informed by logic itself. What we 
must resist is thinking that somehow consideration of actual pro-
cesses and procedures of inferential cognition is to inform the very 
characterization of validity and invalidity. The sophisticated 
consequentialist can reason similarly about ethics. We certainly do 
not want morality to be entirely impractical, such that it couldn't 
help us at all in deciding how to raise our children or live our lives. 
But we must be careful about what we infer from this; we need not 
conclude that the actual procedures of ethical decision making 
should inform the characterization of right and wrong. We should 
also be careful not to fall prey to a potential equivocation. Cer-
tainly, when a teacher teaches her students cognitive strategies, 
there is some meaning of the word "logic" such that what she is 
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doing is teaching them "logic", but this is not the same as logic in 
philosophical sense. Similarly, when we teach our children how to 
respond to moral quandaries and difficult life situations, we are 
teaching them "morality", but not necessarily morality in the sense 
ethical theorists are primarily interested in. 
Doubtlessly, the critic of consequentialism may still feel that 
this response on the part of the sophisticated consequentialist is 
not adequate. But it simply would not be felicitous to pursue this 
matter any further in this context, especially as I believe there are 
compelling reasons to think that both sides are ultimately mistaken. 
While I do think that Railton has given a compelling response to 
these objections, further exploration of the response reveals prob-
lems not only for consequentialism, but any moral theory focusing 
on right and wrong. I will be excused, therefore, for not pursuing 
this debate any further if I am right in thinking that there are bigger 
fish to fry. 
First we must take a closer look at exactly how Railton's strat-
egy is supposed to work, and perhaps take it a bit further. As it is, it 
is rather unclear. In fact, at one point Railton comes very close to 
contradicting himself. To see this, let us return to the case of Juan 
and the decision of whether to visit Linda or send the check to 
Oxfam. Railton suggests that the objective consequentialist sees 
the act of visiting Linda as, strictly speaking, a wrong act. But, of 
course, it is not left at that. Railton also wants to stress that this 
wrong act of Juan's is defensible, because it is made inevitable by 
Juan's having developed a character which, of those available to 
him, leads to the best consequences. Railton seems to want to claim 
that, in visiting Linda, Juan is committing a blameless wrongdo-
ing. However, Railton cannot consistently hold this. Railton sup-
poses that, although it is true that Juan could still send the check to 
Oxfam if he tried, Juan will not try to send the check because it is 
inconsistent with the character he has rightly acquired. Railton 
seems to be operating with an understanding of what a character 
trait or disposition is such that to have one is to have limitations 
placed on what one will actually attempt to do in certain cases. He 
suggests that in order for Juan to have been able to send the check 
he would have had to have a different, and less good overall, char-
acter. Thus we must suppose that what it means to have a disposi-
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tion to act in a certain way is for it to sometimes (we need not 
suppose always) be the case that one cannot lawfully act except in 
a certain way. There are at least some occasions, and this is one, in 
which Juan simply cannot put Oxfam or some other impersonal 
cause before Linda. However, if this is true, it means that Juan 
cannot actually send the check to Oxfam because in order to actu-
ally try (at least on this occasion) to perform this "better" act he 
would have had to have developed a different—and less good over-
all—character. However, according to consequentialism, ought 
implies can. The right act is the one (or one of the set of acts) 
available to the agent such that no other available act has better 
consequences. But sending the check is not an available act to Juan. 
Sending the check is impossible given the character he has in fact 
developed. Thus, Juan has not committed a wrong-doing by not 
sending the check. 13 But this is directly contrary to what Railton 
himself says. Something is amiss here. I propose to attempt to sort 
it out, perhaps in the process revising or at least restating Railton's 
position, for I fear this will be necessary if any sense is to be made 
of his response. 
It seems there are two possible revisions we could make to 
Railton's theory. The first would be to take seriously his claim that 
the objective consequentialist would still regard Juan's act of visit-
ing Linda as a wrongdoing. To take this route, however, we will 
have to deny that it is inconsistent with his character to have stayed 
home and sent the check instead. The second revision would be to 
maintain that visiting Linda is inevitable given Juan's character, 
and that sending the check would have required Juan to have pre-
viously developed a different character. In the latter case, visiting 
Linda would not be claimed to be a wrongdoing at all. According 
to this strategy, Juan's visiting Linda is a necessary consequence 
of Juan's having developed the right sorts of dispositions and char-
acter traits, a perhaps unfortunate consequence of which is that he 
inevitably does something on occasion which, while not wrong, 
has less good consequences than something else we could imagine 
him doing if his character were slightly different. It seems to me 
that Railton is forced to adopt the second of these two approaches 
if his response is to have any bite. Imagine instead that he adopts 
the first revision, admitting that, even given his character, Juan 
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could still try to send the check on this occasion, and that he would 
send the check if he did try. From this it follows that the objective 
consequentialist must say that he should send the check. So far, 
there is nothing that Railton would find objectionable. However, 
the problem is that, understood in this way, the case can no longer 
be used as a response to the critic of consequentialism. Railton 
wanted this to be a case of defensible wrongdoing. Understood in 
this way, it is a wrongdoing. But is it defensible? Railton claimed it 
was blameless because it is the result of Juan's having acquired a 
certain character that is best, all things considered. But if we make 
the supposition that we have—that it is consistent with his charac-
ter, even on this occasion, that Juan send the check instead—it is 
no longer clear how Juan's act is a necessary result of his having 
acquired this good character. If the act is not a necessary result of 
his having acquired this character, i.e. if he could both have the 
disposition and nevertheless not act in this way, in what way does 
his having that character make the act any less objectionable? Thus, 
Railton seems to lose his ability to use this case as a response to the 
critic, because he doesn't seem to have a way of defending Juan's 
actions even within sophisticated consequentialism, and hence his 
theory seems just as inadequate as subjective consequentialism at 
capturing the intuitions lying behind the original objections. 
What we are left with, then, is the alternative way of revising 
Railton's account. Here, we insist that Juan could not have sent the 
check, thus admitting that his act was in no way wrong even ac-
cording to objective consequentialism. This way is still able to stave 
off the objections of the consequentialist critic. In fact, it does so 
better, for here the consequentialist is actually able to agree with 
the non-consequentialist that Juan has done nothing wrong by put-
ting his wife first. I think, moreover, that there are additional rea-
sons to prefer this way of understanding the position. It seems to 
better capture what it is to have a deeply held project or relation-
ship to someone. To love someone, arguably, necessarily involves 
being psychologically constituted to at least sometimes naturally 
act with disproportionate and special concern for her. Part of what 
it is for Juan to love Linda as much as he does is for it sometimes to 
be lawfully impossible for him to do things such as putting Oxfam 
before her when she has had a hard week. If Railton's "disposi-
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tions" or "characters" are to capture such things, then it seems logi-
cal to think of them, too, as limitations placed on what sorts of 
things it is lawfully possible for a person to do. This coheres well 
with the teachings of modern psychology. Psychologists warn 
against thinking that any person is equally likely to perform any 
conceivable action; rather, what action an agent will take in a situ-
ation is a function of the way her character has been shaped and 
conditioned by past experiences, upbringing, environmental fea-
tures and genetic tendencies (or, as they say, nature and nurture). 
Thus, we shouldn't assume that Juan is psychologically capable of 
sending the check merely because he has the money in the bank, 
knows how to write a check and is aware of the need. Whether 
Juan will or lawfully can send the check is partly a function of 
what his character traits are. 
If this is the route for the consequentialist to take, the response 
to the critic will be rich indeed. We can imagine the sophisticated 
consequentialist saying roughly this to the critic. "You have pointed 
to a number of thought experiments and have insisted that, in these 
hypothetical scenarios, consequentialism tells us that something 
which is clearly wrong is right, be it twisting the child's arm, let-
ting one's own child drown or forgoing one's own project to fur-
ther that of some stranger. But it is not so simple. One cannot sim-
ply describe a hypothetical scenario without also talking about the 
character traits and disposi t ions of the agents in them. 
Consequentialism is a theory that picks the right act out of a list of 
available actions, but what acts actually are available is a function 
of the agent's personality, character and conditioning. If we enrich 
our cases with a consideration of these things, the puzzles dissolve. 
If I am an ideal sophisticated consequentialist agent, then it would 
have been right for me to have developed a disposition such that I 
am often unable to twist a child's arm, ignore my spouse or child 
in distress or abandon my own projects at the drop of a hat. There-
fore, these are not, and in fact, could not, be the right things for me 
to do in these hypothetical cases. If we suppose instead that I have 
not developed these dispositions, then it may be true that my theory 
entails that the right thing for me to do is twist the arm or ignore 
my spouse, but this is only because of the antecedent wrongdoing 
of ignoring my duties with regard to my own moral character. Thus, 
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consequentialism is not so blind to these things as you suggest." 
This is an extremely powerful response on behalf of the 
consequentialist. In fact, I think in it lies one of the most profound 
and interesting insights that has arisen within 20ih century ethical 
theory: that we cannot study acts in isolation. Any action that I 
make is the result of a long causal process, and was made possible 
by my having been socialized to have a certain sort of character 
and personality. In performing ethical assessment, we must not only 
examine the act in question, but (pardoning the Kantian jargon) 
the conditions of its possibility. Thus, it is not so much that the 
sophisticated consequentialist—so understood—accepts and ap-
proves of Juan's decision not to send the money to Oxfam, but 
rather, that the sophisticated consequentialist accepts and approves 
of what Juan did such that the act of sending the money to Oxfam 
became impossible, that is, the act of acquiring a strong devotion 
to his wife. At this point, then, consequentialism may seem to have 
been vindicated. However, there are still problems on the horizon. 
The response given so far has gone a step in what I take to be the 
right direction: noticing that acts cannot be considered in isolation, 
and that we must understand acts as the result of causal processes 
involving people's characters, personality traits, patterns of behav-
ior, etc. The problem is that once down this road, there is no turn-
ing back until ethical theory is no longer about right and wrong 
action at all. While I find nothing objectionable with this, it tolls 
the death bell both for consequentialism and for its more 
deontological rivals. To this I now turn. 
4. Psychological Determinism and the Real Failure of 
Consequentialism 
In order to respond to its critics, consequentialism is forced to make 
some radical moves. What is radical about them? If I am right, 
they amount to a complete shift in the focus of moral assessment 
and moral theorizing. What we shall see is that this shift is one that 
consequentialism itself cannot survive. 
What is the shift? Recall that the critics of consequentialism 
were operating from certain shared assumptions about what moral 
theory is about. In particular, they believed that moral theory ought 
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to tell us as individuals how to go about deliberation when faced 
with moral decisions. In fact, their criticisms of consequentialism 
stemmed largely from their focus on the features of moral agents 
as deliberators, and the claim that the model of moral deliberation 
put forth by consequentialism fails to do justice to these features of 
us as agents. Railton responded by making a distinction between 
objective and subjective consequentialism. It is true, one might 
admit, that subjective consequentialism falls prey to their objec-
tions. It actually attempts to provide a theory about how we ought 
to go about moral reasoning and deliberation, and therefore, if it 
fails to adequately capture essential features of the nature of moral 
agency, it fails as a theory. But objective consequentialism does 
not aim so high. Objective consequentialism does not aim to be a 
theory at all about how individuals should go about moral delib-
eration. It is meant only as a theory of the truth conditions of the 
Tightness or wrongness of actions. Here, we have already seen one 
shift in what moral theory is supposed to provide for us. Rather 
than provide us with an actual method for moral deliberation, it 
aims only to provide us with criteria that distinguish right action 
from wrong action. While moral theory might eventually give us 
some help in moral deliberation, it is not its primary goal. 
But if what I argued in the previous section is also correct, the 
shift does end there. As Railton conceives it, consequentialism is a 
theory that tells us not how to reason morally, but at least tells us 
whether certain acts are right or wrong. However, we must pose 
the question of exactly what sort of acts does (sophisticated) 
consequentialism tell us are right or wrong? Is it the actual acts 
taken by the agent in the situation, or the antecedent acts and deci-
sions that lead to the development of the character and disposi-
tions the agent has, which, in turn, lead to the action? It seems that 
it must be the latter. To see this, let us return to the case of Juan, the 
trip to see Linda and the letter to Oxfam. I argued that, contrary to 
what Railton explicitly says, he cannot claim that Juan committed 
a wrong act in visiting Linda. But it also would be misleading to 
conclude that Juan committed the right act on that occasion. We 
are presupposing that Juan's character development has made it 
inevitable that he visits Linda. Therefore, while it may be true that 
Juan had no available act that would have had better consequences, 
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this is only trivially true. It would be less misleading then to say 
that the sophisticated consequentialist simply withholds judgment 
about whether Juan's isolated act of visiting Linda is right or wrong. 
Rather, the important question for the sophisticated consequentialist 
is whether the disposition or character Juan has acquired is right 
or wrong. In this case, it is supposed that Juan's character is better 
than the others available, and hence, Juan has the right disposi-
t ion. 1 4 Therefore, we can see that the shift is indeed a large one. If 
Railton's approach works, it reorients moral theory not only away 
from providing a theory about how people ought to go about rea-
soning in difficult moral situations, but also away from even pro-
viding criteria for distinguishing right action from wrong action 
when what is under consideration is a particular act undertaken in 
a particular situation. For this sort of consequentialist, the interest-
ing moral questions are questions about the right sort of moral char-
acter or dispositions a person should have; they are not questions 
about how a person ought to act on a particular occasion. How a 
person will act in a particular situation, it will be insisted, is a func-
tion of her character and dispositions, and so we ought to focus on 
not the Tightness and wrongness of the act but the character and 
dispositions leading to it. 
My objection to this strategy is not that it has shifted the focus 
of ethical theory. It is instead a question of whether it has shifted 
far enough. In concluding that what action a person will take in a 
particular instance is the result of the confluence of the character 
traits and dispositions the person has antecedently acquired, the 
approach taken by the consequentialist is one that presupposes the 
truth of what could be called psychological determinism, or at least 
of something very close to i t . 1 5 This is the thesis that when a per-
son finds herself in a certain situation or environment (i.e. state of 
the world) in which she is faced with a decision, there is only one 
lawfully possible action available to her compatible with the char-
acter traits and behavioral dispositions she has antecedently ac-
quired. I argued earlier that we cannot make sense of Railton's 
claims in the scenario about Juan and Linda unless we suppose 
that Juan's visit was made inevitable by his character. Psychologi-
cal determinism is assuredly a controversial empirical hypothesis, 
but it seems to me to be a plausible one given the views of the 
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majority of contemporary psychologists. Let us, for the moment, 
grant it as a hypothesis. The question now becomes, what does this 
mean for moral theory? I suggest that once this hypothesis is made, 
it not only damns attempting to make assessments about right or 
wrong when applied to individual actions, but undermines the very 
coherence of talking in terms of right or wrong at all in moral theory, 
including the lightness or wrongness of dispositions and charac-
ters. 
I have argued this in somewhat greater detail in a somewhat 
different context elsewhere. 16 My argument there was roughly this. 
The distinction between right and wrong in ethical theory depends 
on being able to develop a list of alternative actions a person can 
perform in some set of circumstances and then adducing criteria 
by which to determine which of those actions are right and which 
are wrong. Consequentialism does this by ranking the available 
options according to the sum total of goodness and badness that 
results from each. Other theories take a different approach. How-
ever, if psychological determinism should prove to be true, and in 
each case there is only one lawfully possible action for an agent 
given her character, upbringing, dispositions and the environment 
and situation she finds herself in, then there is no plausible way of 
generating the requisite list of alternatives. Arguments attempting 
to show that the tightness and wrongness of an act does not pre-
suppose alternative possibilities as well as attempts at defining the 
list of alternative possibilities independently from what is actually 
lawfully possible are found to be unworkable. Because I have ar-
gued this in more detail elsewhere, I will not duplicate things here. 
Rather, we must investigate how this applies to this debate. 
I argued earlier that if the consequentialist takes Railton's strat-
egy of replying to the critics, it ends up shifting the focus or theme 
of ethical theory. In assessing the actions and character of Juan, the 
sophisticated consequentialist cannot assess Juan's individual act 
of visiting Linda as either right or wrong, but is instead pushed to 
assess the broader character Juan has that made the act inevitable. 
The problem is, how is the consequentialist to make even this lat-
ter assessment? Consequentialism is a theory about right and wrong, 
holding that what is right is that of the available options with maxi-
mal consequences. If the assessment of Juan's character is to be at 
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all consequentialist, it must be that Juan's act of having acquired 
this character leads to better overall results than any other possible 
modes of character development Juan might have taken. But the 
question, of course, is what other modes of character development! 
If psychological determinism is true, then every act Juan ever took 
and every decision he made—even those regarding what sorts of 
dispositions or traits he cultivates in himself—were determined. 
There are no other possible characters Juan might have had or other 
disposi t ions he might have developed. How, then, can 
consequentialists make any sort of determination of whether his 
character is the right one for him any more than they can make a 
determination about whether his acts are right or wrong? 
Recall that the sophisticated consequentialist response to 
deontological critics was to argue that one cannot simply pose a 
thought experiment or hypothetical situation without also consid-
ering the limitations placed on what sort of acts a person can take 
in such a situation by her upbringing, conditioning and character. 
Therefore, one cannot prove consequentialism wrong by showing 
that in the favored deontological cases, consequentialism gives the 
wrong answer. Consequentialists won't simply admit that it is right 
to twist the arm, or ignore your wife in favor of Oxfam. These 
options are not always available, and are likely not available at all 
if the agent in question is a good sophisticated consequentialist 
agent. One cannot naively assume that any act we can conceive of 
a person doing in a situation is in fact available to that agent. Con-
straints are placed upon what is even possible by what has hap-
pened before and how a person's personality and character have 
been shaped by past events and past decisions. But notice that this 
same naivete is present in the consequentialist assumption that any 
character traits we can imagine Juan as having are possible for him 
to have. It's true that every person's personality, behavioral dispo-
sitions and character change over time. We make decisions about 
our lives, strive to become different sorts of people, make and break 
habits, train ourselves to think certain ways, etc. But all of the de-
cisions we make about our own character and what sorts of dispo-
sitions and traits we have are equally determined, if psychological 
determinism is true. How, then, are we to claim that certain pos-
sible characters are right while others are wrong? In the end, the 
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character a person has is the only one that was lawfully possible 
for him or her. 
I do think there is something right about the sort of sophisti-
cated consequentialism suggested by Railton. What is right about 
it is that it recognizes that human behavior does not come out of 
nowhere. What actions we perform on what occasions is a func-
tion of the situations we find ourselves in and the ways in which 
we have trained ourselves to have certain characters and to have 
certain dispositions as to how to think, reason and act. Sophisti-
cated consequentialism understands humans as part of the causal 
world, as beings who not only cause things to be the case, but have 
their personalities and behavior shaped by genetics and environ-
ment. The problem is that sophisticated consequentialism does not 
go far enough. If we truly are to understand not only human behav-
ior but humans themselves as the result of causal processes, a sort 
of infusion of the input of genetics, environment, upbringing and 
similar forces, then unless we are apt to see a person's genetics or 
the state of the world a person finds herself in as right or wrong, it 
makes little sense to make such an evaluation of the necessary con-
sequences of these things. 
The problem, therefore, with sophisticated consequentialism 
is that it is still consequentialism, and consequentialism is a theory 
about right and wrong. Where sophisticated consequentialism goes 
wrong is not in realizing that isolated actions cannot be naively 
labeled as right or wrong independently of the consideration of the 
characters and dispositions leading to them. Rather, where sophis-
ticated consequentialism goes wrong is thinking that we must there-
fore try instead to apply the same criteria for tightness and wrong-
ness that had previously been applied to acts in isolation to the 
assessment of the development of a person's character. It is as if it 
was simply assumed that ethical theory had to somewhere include 
the concepts of tightness and wrongness and since it was realized 
that these could not be applied to acts simpliciter, they were in-
stead applied to the dispositions and characters leading to them. 
If we go down the route I am suggesting, I think we must aban-
don any moral theory that centers itself around the concepts of 
right and wrong. If psychological determinism is true, then there is 
no basis for determining the list of possible alternatives to an ac-
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tion such that we can make distinctions about what is right and 
wrong from that list. Railton's response to the objections to 
consequentialism, however, seem to wed consequentialism's hopes 
to psychological determinism or something relevantly similar. 
Therefore, ultimately, what Railton has provided us is not a de-
fense of consequentialism, but an argument for its very incoher-
ence. This is not to say that consequential ism's more deontological 
rivals fare any better. They too center around the determination of 
right and wrong. In fact, if anything, their view is the worse off of 
the two. They naively assume that a theory of what makes an act 
right and wrong must also be a theory about how agents ought to 
go about conducting moral deliberation. This being the case, they 
insist that moral theory must do justice to the nature of persons as 
moral agents and thus to the personal point of view with which we 
enter into moral deliberations. As much as their theory stresses the 
nature of moral agency, it seems that it leaves out some of the most 
important facts about moral agents: that what decisions we actu-
ally make when faced with moral decisions are shaped by our char-
acters, motivational dispositions and past development. In fact, it 
doesn't seem to me that any current ethical theory has truly come 
to grips with this fact about human agency. 
Of course, there remains a response that I have not considered, 
and that is simply to deny psychological determinism, insisting 
instead that there are always, or at least in the interesting moral 
cases considered earlier, multiple actions the agent in question could 
take compatible with the laws of nature, current state of the world 
and the antecedently acquired character of the agent. This may be 
a genuine alternative to the sort of revisions to moral theory I am 
suggesting. I admitted earlier that psychological determinism is a 
controversial empirical hypothesis. In fact, it may be false. I have 
been merely assuming its truth because it seemed the only way to 
make sense of Railton's response. Therefore, it probably is not a 
viable option for Railton, or for anyone who wishes to use his sort 
of response, to deny psychological determinism. 1 7 But it may re-
main a viable option for a critic of consequentialism to make this 
move. But it seems to me that such a theorist does this at her own 
risk. For all its controversy, it seems to me that psychological de-
terminism—or something relevantly similar to it—is plausible and 
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consistent with the teaching of modern psychology. In fact, its de-
nial seems to entail granting some special metaphysical or causal 
status to human beings that seems out of sorts with the modern 
trend of regarding humans and their actions as simply part and 
parcel of the natural world, as amenable to scientific explanation 
and prediction as chemical compounds, amoebas and planetary 
bodies. But this leads us to other debates in philosophy, ones it is 
best not to tackle here. I am content simply to remain at an impasse 
with those who disagree with psychological determinism. I am more 
interested in the question of what follows if it is true. It may not be 
as bad for moral theory as one might fear. 
5. Ethics Without Right and Wrong 
Many people assume that ethics must be about right and wrong. 
This attitude is so pervasive that some will conclude that if my 
conclusion is that ethics is not about right and wrong, this serves as 
a reductio ad absurdum of my entire position. Others may con-
clude instead from what I have said so far that if determinism is 
true, ethics becomes meaningless or pointless. I would like to ar-
gue instead that even if psychological determinism is true and eth-
ics must abandon right and wrong as its organizing concepts, there 
can still be a very interesting and fruitful place for moral theory in 
not only academia but in society. 
Sophisticated consequentialism pace Railton takes a step to-
wards the right sort of ethical theory. I argued in the previous sec-
tion that this approach shifts the role of ethics such that it not only 
does not attempt to provide a model for "correct" moral agency 
but also does not even attempt to evaluate individual acts as right 
or wrong. It instead focuses on the evaluations of whole patterns 
of behavior or dispositions or types of characters. I have argued, 
however, that this theory is mistaken for clinging to the idea that 
we can sensibly evaluate certain characters or dispositions as be-
ing right and others as being wrong for a particular person. How-
ever, I do believe that this general model of what ethics ought to 
concern itself with is correct. Ethics ought to concern itself not 
with the assessment of individual acts, but with the assessment of 
whole patterns of behavior and types of acts, and how these pat-
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terns relate to personality and character types. Like Railton, and 
probably more so, I am aware that actions have to be understood as 
the result of a causal process, and that we cannot examine an act in 
isolation from how the conditions that made the act possible (i.e. 
the character and dispositions of the agent performing it) have other 
effects that also have to be understood and taken into account. What 
I propose is that ethics is the study of different causal relationships 
between actions, certain dispositions and their consequences com-
bined with the use of the knowledge gained by this study in the 
attempt to make people into better moral agents. 
I need to be much clearer about exactly what I have in mind. 
The first thing to note is that nothing here calls into question any 
theory about value. Consequentialists tend to assume that there is 
such a thing as good and bad, and that it can be measured. If we 
assume this to be the case, we have the grounds for developing an 
interesting moral theory. We can study people's actions and their 
effects, and even measure how much good is brought about by 
certain actions. Pooling and analyzing this information, we can 
gain very important insights. While we cannot say, for example, 
that Juan's developing a deep devotion to his wife leads to better 
consequences than the other options available to him (for there 
were none), we might discover that, statistically speaking, people 
who develop such deep attachments for their spouses tend, overall, 
to produce more happiness, desire-satisfaction, or other form of 
intrinsic good (whatever it happens to be, according to our axiology) 
than people who attempt instead to treat people impartially. Hav-
ing this information will be extremely useful, and in a derivative 
sense, its propagation might help people like Juan make decisions. 
There is no end to the sort of information we could gather. 
It may even be hoped that this sort of ethics could lead to moral 
progress, via what we could call "moral technology". Moral tech-
nology is simply our use of the information we acquire through 
such studies to improve society. After we've obtained copious in-
formation regarding, e.g., whether children who are taught to have 
a disposition against lying end up producing more good than chil-
dren who receive no such teaching, we might use this information 
to set up a society in which children receive a sort of moral train-
ing that in general leads to a happier and better society overall than 
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the sort of society we live in now. (Notice, however, that I do not 
say that such children would receive the "right" sort of moral train-
ing, nor that our present moral training is "wrong".) This sort of 
technology is just like any other sort of technology. Scientists have 
studied all sorts of patterns of interactions regarding physical ob-
jects and how they respond to various stimuli, and after collecting 
such information, they have been able to put it to use to build bet-
ter bridges, faster computers and safer cars. But they do not say 
that the bridges, computers and cars of the past were "wrong" for 
not living up to the new inventions. Both the new and the old things 
operate entirely according to the laws of nature. I don't see any 
reason to think any differently about humans. 
In fact, the pursuit of moral technology might lead us eventu-
ally to be able to provide exactly what many people will think is 
lacking from this sort of moral theory. I mentioned earlier that many 
theorists, especially critics of consequentialism, believe that ethics 
must, as a matter of definition, provide us with a way of under-
standing how people ought to go about reasoning and deliberating 
about morally relevant choices. I believe ethics can do this, but 
only at a derivative level. We can perform studies of what the re-
sults are of people being trained to approach moral decision mak-
ing in different ways. We could compare people who are trained to 
think like subjective consequentialists with people who are trained 
to abide by the categorical imperative in their deliberations. In all 
likelihood, neither of these will actually be the sort of deliberation 
strategy that will end up producing the best overall effects. The 
rule of "try to maximize consequences" is far too broad a rule to 
really aid people in any sort of concrete decision making processes. 
Psychologists generally see people as making use of heuristics in 
decision making, highly specific rules of thumb that are particular 
to one or more regions of thought. This is simply what works best 
for people, and I imagine that the best sort of moral education will 
be some combination of rules of thumb mixed with some more 
open-ended principles (e.g. the golden rules) to provide some di-
rection in unfamiliar cases. But from my perspective, these are all 
a posteriori questions to be answered only after a long period of 
empirical research. Nevertheless, one shouldn't conclude that psy-
chological determinism precludes the possibility of the use of ethi-
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cal theory to aid people in moral decision making. That may be 
one of its eventual functions. I simply resist seeing it as the funda-
mental or organizing function. 
I should be clearer about what I mean when I suggest that the 
use of this sort of "moral technology" might aid people in their 
decision making or improve society. Of course, if my theory is to 
be compatible with determinism, I cannot hold that moral technol-
ogy will help people to select one of numerous options that are 
actually lawfully possible for them at a certain time, or that moral 
technology could be used to make society better than we might 
lawfully have made it instead. It might then be objected that what 
I am suggesting is self-refuting; if we cannot alter our future ac-
tions, how can we make things better through moral technology? 
If all of our decisions are determined already, how can this sort of 
ethical theory aid our decision making? Here we must be careful. 
Firstly, when it comes to individual decisions, one must not con-
fuse determinism with fatalism (understood as the view that one's 
own decisions do not affect her own fate). Any plausible version of 
psychological determinism will still hold that people make deci-
sions and that those decisions affect their actions; it will only add 
that these very decisions are themselves made inevitable by previ-
ous events and causal processes already at work. So the psycho-
logical determinist does believe that decisions lead to action. What 
decisions an agent makes in a given situation is a factor of many 
causal influences, but one important factor is the knowledge the 
agent has. When I suggest that research into different causal rela-
tionships between various types of actions and good and bad con-
sequences might help to aid people in moral decision making, I am 
merely pointing out that we have good reason to believe that those 
people who are knowledgeable about such research will make de-
cisions that on average lead them to take actions that have conse-
quences better than actions taken by others who have no such knowl-
edge. I do not mean to suggest that the decisions they make will be 
better than other lawfully possible decisions they do not make. 
When it comes to the improvement of society, here too we must be 
careful. When I say that we can use moral technology to "alter" 
society for the better, I do not mean to suggest that we can create a 
society better than others we might have had instead. Rather, I mean 
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we can change society over time and improve it from what it was, 
in the exact same sense that computer scientists and technicians 
have improved computers over time. Determinism is not the same 
thing as complete lack of change. Even if the world is a deter-
mined one, people and societies can (and often do) improve and 
alter themselves for the better, and oftentimes the catalyst for such 
changes is knowledge. 
When I speak of such things as using empirical research to 
discover what sorts of dispositions and actions and patterns of be-
havior lead to better overall consequences than others, it may seem 
to some that right and wrong have now crept back into my theory. 
In a sense, I agree (although this terminology may be a bit mis-
leading). One way of describing the process described above is as 
an inquiry into what the right sort of moral education is. I do think 
that we can perhaps devise some derivative uses for "right" and 
"wrong" in moral theory. For example, I find it likely that study 
will find that slavery is wrong, where what is meant by this is that 
societies that incorporate slavery produce much less good (all other 
things being equal, etc.) than those that do not. One could imagine 
that, therefore, we could similarly investigate the Tightness or 
wrongness of such things as pornography, prostitution and animal 
rights. But we must be very careful. This sort of statistical analysis 
of "right" and "wrong" can only be applied to questions about types 
of acts, character traits and institutions. I don't see any way of 
applying it to individual acts or characters. Thus, for example, we 
might discover that "being devoted to one's spouse" is a good thing, 
and in this sense, right, because those people who are so devoted, 
other things being equal, tend statistically to bring about better 
consequences that those who are not. However, I do not see any 
similar way of analyzing Juan's devotion in particular. To say that 
Juan's devotion is right is to compare it to something else that might 
have happened, but we've already discussed why this will not work. 
One might attempt to create a sense of "right" that applies to 
specific actions by identifying them as members of a class of ac-
tions that are "right" in the sense described earlier. Juan is right for 
being devoted to Linda in the sense that his devotion is one in-
stance of devotion to one's spouse in general, which we have de-
termined to be right by statistical means. However, if we do this, 
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we will quickly run into problems. Almost any act is amenable to 
all sorts of different descriptions, and whether it will be right or 
wrong in this sense will depend on which description is being used. 
For example, it is probably right for parents to spend a great deal 
of time touching their children when what we mean by this is that 
parents who touch their children a lot tend overall to produce bet-
ter consequences than those who do not. But the physically or abu-
sive parent might also be one who touches her child a lot. Cer-
tainly, parents who abuse their children tend overall to produce 
worse consequences that those who do not. Thus, the particular 
actions of abusive parents are "right" under one description, and 
"wrong" under another description. This will only lead to confu-
sion. It think it is best if we simply do not attempt to try to apply 
this theory to the lightness and wrongness of individual action. 
Surely, there will be many who will be disappointed with any 
moral theory that does not provide a method for determining the 
Tightness or wrongness of particular actions. But I do not share this 
view. I have already described how moral theory could acquire 
interesting information about various causal processes relating to 
the production of good and bad states of affairs, and how the ac-
quisition of such information could lead to moral progress and aid 
us in our moral decision making. What else is really left to be de-
sired? My own political commitments make me wary particularly 
of those who attempt to use a theory of moral right or wrong (or of 
moral responsibility) to justify seeing themselves as superior moral 
agents (and thereby justifying for themselves a greater amount of 
resources, etc.) On my own theory, we must understand all people's 
actions, even the criminal, as ultimately the result of causal pro-
cesses. We can use our knowledge of such causal processes to make 
the world a better place. However, the point is not to differentiate 
people into the morally worthy and the morally unworthy. I see no 
purpose for this whatsoever. 
The reader will have probably noticed that my theory is not 
really so different from consequentialism after all. In fact, I do 
think that the spirit, if not the letter, of consequentialism is true. As 
Rawls would likely put it (although he would disagree), I believe 
that ethical theory must begin with the theory of the good and pro-
ceed from there. My difference with the consequentialist is simply 
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how quickly one can (or whether one can at all) proceed from there 
to a theory of the right. For these reasons, I am a bit less bothered 
than many at the dominant role consequentialism has come to play 
in moral theory. In the end, however, we can do better. 18 
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